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Abstract
This brief note rises doubts on the argument that nudging will help people
to behave more rational in terms of their own preferences. This justification of
soft paternalism overlooks some methodological problems of expected utility
theory which are one of the roots of behavioral economics.
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1 Introduction: nudging people to behave “more
rational”
Insights from Behavioral Economics can be used for a more effective design of eco-
nomic policy. The justification of policy measures often relies on conventional ar-
guments such as market failure (e.g. externalities), or the theory of merit goods.
One example is the broad literature about nudging consumers towards more sustain-
able consumption patterns (Pasche 2014, Shogren and Taylor 2008, Venkatachalam
2008). Here, nudging is used as a new policy instrument, and it becomes more
popular to ask behavioral economists and psychologists for policy advice (Madrian
2014, Amir and Lobel 2008).
Soft paternalism, however, is more than that. Here, it is argued that deficiencies
in individual rationality, such like (time-) inconsistencies, intransitivities, and cog-
nitive biases, prevent individuals from choosing the optimal alternative – optimal in
terms of their own subjective preferences. Henceforth, economic behavior which is
coordinated on markets will typically not lead to efficient outcomes. Thus, beside
market failures like market power, externalities or information asymmetry problems,
also deficiencies of individual rationality might constitute an additional justification
for governmental intervention. It appears possible to “nudge” people to the “right”
way in order to behave more consistent with their own interests but without limit-
ing their freedom of choice (O’Donogue and Rabin 2003, Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
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Obviously, this touches deep questions of individualism and liberalism and is there-
fore discussed very controversal although the idea is to keep the individual’s full
freedom of choice (see Sugden 2008, and recently Schnellenbach 2012, Kirchga¨ssner
2014, Binder 2014, Binder and Lades 2015).
It is exactly this idea of enabling people to behave “more rational” in terms
of their own preferences which is discussed critically from a methodological point
of view in this brief note. It will not be drawn into question that insights from
behavioral economics about typical patterns of boundedly rational belief formation
and decision making could be useful for a more effective policy design1. And the
arguments are only indirectly related to the field of political philosophy whether
nudging might be consistent with liberalism or not. The latter debate is more about
the legitimacy of paternalism. Instead, I will concentrate on the methodological
concept of rationality and its narrow interpretation in the axiomatic utility theory
and thus on the question whether it is possible and meaningful to “improve” in-
dividual rationality by nudging. A couple of literature contributions have recently
discussed already methodological obstacles which should only briefly repeated here
(see Binder 2014 for an extensive overview). What this brief note emphasizes is that
(i) if we start from the rationality concept in utility theory there is no logical and
empirical basis for deriving knowledge about the “true” preferences, (ii) it is doubt-
ful whether utiity theory is an adequate normative basis for a behavioral economist,
(iii) the perception of “anomalies” and “deficiencies” is misleading, (iv) paternalism
in all forms falls behind a Public Choice perspective of policymaking and thus lacks
itself a behavioral foundation of social mechanism design.
2 What do we know about the decision maker’s
preferences?
Inconsistent or non-optimal decision making means in the first place, that the axioms
of expected utility theory (EUT) are not capable to describe the observed behavior.
It lacks descriptive and thus explanatory power in the sense of a positive theory.
However, EUT is still taken as the ultimative normative benchmark for rationality.
Therefore, empirical derivations from EUT (so-called “anomalies” or “deficiencies”)
are thus seen as an expression of bounded rationality so that to some extent the
decision maker violates his own preferences. Therefore, he should be happy about
nudges in the “right” direction. Such nudges are based on observed regularities in
the empirical deviations from EUT.
But if we accept that observed behavior is only boundedly rational, the idea
of revealed prefences does not apply. The possibilities to draw conclusions from
observed behavior to the underlying preferences are very limited. Thus, nudging has
to rely on “typical” patterns of EUT deviations so that we can “guess” the underlying
preferences. However, we know that these deviation patterns might depend on
a lot of determinants such like experience, cognitive competence, environmental
conditions, visceral factors etc. But then one cannot be sure that a nudge brings
1This does not neccessarily mean that policy should use nudging technologies to influence the
behavior.
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the decision maker closer to his (alleged) own idiosyncratic preferences. They are
simply an unobservable part of the explanans of rational choice theory. How can
we be sure that the nudges do not reflect the ideas of the policymaker what the
indivdual “ought” to prefer rather than his true preferences? In case of e.g. the
Ellsberg paradoxon or framing effects, there are always various solutions how the
individual could behave in a consistent way. If he does not, however, to which
solution he ought to be nudged? If we observe hyperbolic discounting then we can
nudge the individual by e.g. stimulating precautionary savings or by incentivicing a
reduction of procrastination. The resulting behavior should be time-consistent with
an underlying constant discount rate r. And how large r “should” be so that the
behavior is consistent with the alleged “true” preferences?
In a model of e.g. optimal sin taxes (O’Donogue and Rabin 2006) it seems to
be possible to derive optimal nudges. Those models presuppose a “given” utility
function. But since we cannot conclude from observed behavior to the underlying
utility function (or preferences), the latter is simply unknown. And even worse,
when the individual violates the underlying axioms, the existence and uniqueness
(up to a positive-affine transformation) of such a function is not guaranteed. Hence-
forth, these models presume an omniscient institution which is able to express the
“unbiased” preferences of the individual in a utility function. Then, of course, it
is trivially possible to design an optimal nudge. The point is that such a ficticious
utility function represents more the needs of the modeler who is eager to derive pol-
icy advices, but it is by no means clear whether it represents the individual’s “true”
preferences. Thus, Binder and Lades (2015) suggest not to choose utility theory but
theories of subjective well-being as a starting point.
Let us consider the various attempts to restore the explanatory - or at least de-
scriptive - power of utility theory by modifying or relaxing the underlying axioms.
The most prominent example is the (Cumulative) Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Wakker 1993). The maximization of such utility
functions which do not have the expected utility property delivers a consistent de-
scription of the observed decision behavior in a wide range of cases. What appears
as an anomaly within the EUT framework might now be in line with the predic-
tions of the Prospect Theory (PT). What prevents us from interpreting PT as a
consistent representation of the individual’s preferences about uncertain outcomes?
Accepting and acknowledging these specifities in choice behavior which appear as
anomalies in light of the EUT, delivers us information about the underlying prefer-
ences and beliefs as characterized by PT – but not sufficient information about how
this individual would decide if it would be perfectly rational.
Some behavioral economists argue that it is possible to construct “informed
preferences” (see e.g. Thaler and Sunstein 2003) which reflect what the individual
would choose if he is adequatly informed and would have unlimited cognitive abili-
ties. But it is unclear when a choice can be identified as being “informed”. I don’t
see neither a logical nor an empirical way to derive the EUT conforming preferences
from boundedly rational choices. And as long as there are leeways of interpretation
which are utilized by the policymaker, one should be very sceptical about welfare
improvement of nudges.
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3 Are there good reasons for behavioral “anoma-
lies”?
A proper design of nudging instruments has to rely on stylized facts about typi-
cal decision “anomalies”. But why do we observe regular behavioral patterns of
“anomalies”? If such regular patterns have emerged as an outcome e.g. of evolu-
tionary adaption or individual learning, how could it be that individuals adapted
to something sub-optimal which violates their own preferences? Here, I subsume
all behavioral approaches of other-regarding or social preferences (including things
like fairness, reciprocity etc.) under the axiomatic utility approach since these ap-
proaches do not draw the rationality concept into question. If we would accept
that people are not maximizing something but use heuristics, rules of thumb, be-
ing influenced by norms, peer groups, making information processing errors etc. as
suggested by prominent behavioral economists, then they clearly do not behave act
rational. But trying to explain these oberseved behavioral regularities – apart from
maximization – in an economic meaningful way brings us to an interpretation of
rationality as “rule rationality” (Aumann 2008).
People have learned to behave in a way which is optimal or at least sufficiently
good not in every specific decision problem but in average in a large set of similar
problems when knowledge is typically incomplete or vague, and information process-
ing and decision errors might occur. These behavioral patterns (rules) are robust
and successful and could be interpreted as an outcome of evolutionary adaption
or learning. Their behavior should not be seen as a priori deficient as the terms
“bounded” rationality and “anomalies” suggest (Berg and Gigerenzer 2007). This
aspect is emphasized by the “fast and frugal heuristics” paradigm of cogntive psy-
chology (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). Other authors like Heiner (1983, 1988) argue
in a similar way that behavioral regularities could be explained as a smart control
of the impact of information processing and decision errors in a complex environ-
ment. Also in experiments it turns out that deviations from EUT could improve
the material outcome rather than reducing it (Berg et al. 2011). Woodford (2012)
demonstrates how “biased” preferences as described by Prospect Theory can induce
favorable outcomes in financial decisions. So there might be “good reasons” for
the rule-governed decision behavior – which is a broader und perhaps more proper
notion of rationality than the EUT axioms (Aumann 2008, Vanberg 2004). These
arguments do not rule out that it might be possible to improve the decision quality
for a single choice act. But they deny to interprete every departure from EUT as a
deficiency which deserves to be healed.
In addition, Binder and Lades (2015) argue that nudges could disencourage criti-
cal reflection of decision behavior and learning, and could thus undermine the auton-
omy. There is also experimental evidence for unintended negative dynamic effects
of nudges (e.g. de Haan and Linde 2012). Thus they claim that only nudges which
foster the ability of the individual to critically analyse his own behavior and to
strengthen it’s autonomy should be considered.
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4 Why should expected utility axioms be the ul-
timate normative benchmark?
Above, it was discussed already that one could choose other starting points for a
consistent description of preferences than EUT. One could object that alternative
approaches such like Prospect Theory have its merits as a descriptive model but
that the “heart” of the normative rationality concept should be EUT as a bench-
mark. The deepest methodological argument against soft paternalism and nudging
draws the axiomatic foundation of this underlying normative rationality concept
into question. Among the various methodological objections against this axiomatic
approach, one of the most challenging is the consistency requirement. “Why be
consistent?”, Robert Sugden asks in his 1985 article, and he denies that inconsis-
tency is a rationale for paternalistic intervention (Sugden 2008). What if I have fun
(utility) to behave in an “inconsistent” way? What if I know that I have unresolved
cognitive problems with countervailing preferences, but I accept this fact? What if
fundamental uncertainty (not simply ambiguity) prevents any probabilistic repre-
sentation of my preferences? What if I consciously accept the possibility of a regret
in the future when making “time-inconsistent” choices (the term, again, presumes
already the acceptance of EUT axioms)?
In the old German fairy tale of Hans im Glu¨ck (Hans in Luck 2), Hans receives
a chunk of gold which he then sequentially exchanges with various other goods with
“obviously” declining value. Every single deal appears him as very beneficial. At the
end he possesses nothing, and he states that he now is the luckiest man all over the
world. In terms of EUT his behavior is a chain of intransitive choices because the
endpoint (having nothing) is strictly prefered to the starting point (having nothing)
which was dominated by having the piece of gold. But is there any logical reason to
deny that Hans’ self-assessment of his final idiosyncratic welfare (“being the luckiest
man all over the world”) could be proven as false (see Schmidt 1995)? Hans’ behavior
is in the first place a problem for the economic modeler who insists on certain axioms,
but the latter is not Hans’ problem.
If non-acceptance of utility theory axioms is per se irrational and if the axioms
are per se non-debatable, then the rationality concept is not much more than a
conspiracy theory (see also Jones 1994). But there might be still “good reasons”
to decide in this or that way apart from a EUT representation, and even in those
cases, behavioral heuristics might work well in the long run. In such cases it is as a
matter of principle not possible to nudge sombody to the “right” direction because
in lack of a normative benchmark it is undefined what “right” should be.
If nudging is a policy implication derived from behavioral economics, then (this
strand of) behavioral economics still uses EUT as the normative core of the ex-
planans, it is not really an alternative to orthodox economics. One could state
that it is not much more than a “neoclassical repair shop” (W. Gu¨th). Thus, those
economists who see behavioral economics as a broader or new paradigm, should have
some problems to justify nudging and soft paternalism as a tool to make individuals
2The story is similar to the English tale The Hedley Kow. It is clear that the story can also be
interpreted in various ways apart from the viewpoint of axiomatic utility theory.
5
behave more in accordance to their own preferences and thus emnhacing efficiency
in the markets. This idea deeply roots in standard neoclassical economics.
5 The Public Choice perspective: who is nudging
and why?
Policymakers are in principle not more rational than others. But the idea is that
they should implememnt general rules and mechanisms instead of making discre-
ationary nudges. Even under the advice of psychologists or behavioral economists
the primary rationale for a policymaker is that the nudge induces behavior which is
favorable for him or his political agenda. The term “paternalism” suggests, however,
that a policymaker decides according to the idiosyncratic preferences of the people.
This falls strongly behind a modern Public Choice perspective and thus behind a
reasonable behavioral foundation of policymaking. As we have seen, there are some
obstacles to the methodological possibility of a welfare improving nudge which gives
a lot of discretionary leeways to the policymaker to define what the “right way” or
“welfare” is.
Since nudging and other forms of soft paternalism are exploiting behavioral reg-
ularities apart from the rational choice model, they might work better the less the
targeted individual is informed about that. This is, however, very problematic in
a liberal society. And it is even more doubtful as the policymaker will follow his
own goal function rather than being the benevolent “father” (lat. pater). Irrespec-
tive of his ideological motivation and his own behavioral “anomalies”, the logic of
political competition will force him towards opportunistic decisions since each po-
litical agenda requires a majority of votes in order to be implemented. Moreover,
this process of policymaking is influenced by external lobbying and the interests
of the bureaucracy, as it is known from Public Choice literature. Henceforth, the
intransparanecy of the process bears a lot of risks when policymakers implement
measures which are based on manipulation of the individuals. Justified by welfare
arguments which can hardly be proven, nudging could be used for any political
agenda or for rent-seeking activites of lobby groups. If any form of nudging – jus-
tified by conventional policy goals apart from rationality-enhancement – should be
considered, then a maximum of transparancy about the aim, design, and behavioral
background is required – even though this might reduce its effectiviness. Any form
of nudging which aims at enhancing people’s rationality, however, would not only
require omnisciency and super-rationality of politicians (sic!), but is also in a sharp
contrast with any reasonable behavioral foundation of policymaking.
6 Conclusion
I support the claim that insights from behavioral economics might be useful for a
more effective policy design, e.g. in environmental policy. It is possible to design the
“rules of the game” in a way that people behave more pro-social, more sustainable,
strengthening reciprocity and promoting trust and trustworthy behavior etc.. As
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long as these measures are not implemented in a hidden intransparent manner and
do not undermine individual’s autonomy, I don’t see why such instruments should
be less justifiable than other (conventional) instruments which are shaping the be-
havior as well, such like taxes. But it is doubtful to claim that others know better
than the individual how to decide according to his own idiosyncratic preferences
(the argument by v.Hayek and Buchanan, see Binder 2014). Based on the insights
of behavioral economics and the methodological discussion of rational preferences,
however, it is also doubtful to justify the exact opposite claim which is the credo of
some liberal economists – liberalism is not grounded on superior rationality of the in-
dividual. There is simply no sufficient methodological basis for rationality-enhancing
nudges. What the government might eventually do, however, is to strengthen the
individual’s autonomy and his ability to critically reflect his behavior (Binder and
Lades 2015). But it is the question whether this should be called libertarian (or
soft) paternalism since this term is now occupied by different meanings. Further-
more, it is doubtful whether EUT should be the ultimate normative benchmark for
the policymaker. These doubts are not grounded on a liberal philosophy, they are
grounded in the methodological criticism of the underlying concept of preferences
and rationality.
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